

[REDACTED] #6-71 TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

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
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TRENDS

in Communist Propaganda

STATSPEC



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10 FEBRUARY 1971
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USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS

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TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 1 - 7 FEBRUARY 1971

Moscow (3529 items)

Indochina	(6%)	17%
[TASS State- ment	(--)	6%]
Syrian Party- Government Dele- gation in USSR	(0.1%)	6%
China	(5%)	5%
Luna 17 & Lunakhod	(2%)	3%
Venus 7	(5%)	1%
SALT	(--)	1%
Middle East	(0.7%)	1%
Angela Davis Case	(3%)	1%

Peking (3247 items)

Indochina	(22%)	47%
[PRC Foreign Ministry Statement	(--)	5%]
Domestic Issues	(45%)	20%
Ceylon National Day	(--)	4%
DPRK Army Day	(--)	4%
Mao Statement on Japan,	(--)	4%
7th Anniversary		
Latin American	(3%)	3%
Territorial Waters		
Commonwealth Conference	(2%)	3%
in Singapore		
Uganda Coup	(--)	2%

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.

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INDOCHINA

High-level Vietnamese communist reaction to the 8 February movement of U.S.-supported ARVN troops into Laos comes on the 10th in DRV and PRG government statements which say that such "maneuvers" as having President Thieu issue a statement cannot hide the fact that it is the Americans who have invaded Laos. The DRV statement asserts that further proof of U.S. "hypocrisy" regarding a political settlement is shown by the fact that the Nixon Administration within the past 10 months has expanded the war to two countries--Cambodia and Laos. The statements echo a DRV foreign ministry statement and a PRG government statement on the 5th in warning the massing of U.S. troops near the 17th parallel may presage new actions against the DRV.

The DRV Government statement says vaguely that "the Vientiane administration, through arguments that turn black into white," has tried to justify the Saigon and U.S. encroachments on Laos. But like other propaganda, it maintains the usual silence regarding the DRV troop presence and obscures the fact that the allied operation is aimed at Vietnamese communist bases and supply routes in Laos.

Peking first officially protested the buildup of allied forces on the Laotian border in a 4 February foreign ministry statement. Another foreign ministry statement on the 8th scored allied ground attacks and called the "large-scale invasion" of Laos a provocation against China--a formula also used in the past in connection with U.S. "escalation" against Cambodia and the DRV. The first explicit Peking reaction to the move into Laos on the 8th appeared late on the 9th in an NCNA dispatch which only briefly alluded to Thieu's announcement while stressing U.S. responsibility for the move.

While high-level Soviet condemnation of rumored allied moves against Laos had come in remarks by Kosygin on 1 and 2 February and in the TASS statement on the 3d, there has to date been no formal Soviet protest over the ARVN move. However, on the 10th Moscow radio reports that during a meeting with DRV Politburo member Le Thanh Nghi--concluding a tour to negotiate aid agreements--Kosygin voiced "resolute condemnation" of the intrusion of U.S. and South Vietnamese troops into Laos as well as the "outrages" in Cambodia and "constant violations" of DRV sovereignty.

DRV GOVERNMENT, PRG ISSUE PROTESTS ON ALLIED "INVASION" OF LAOS

While routine Hanoi and Front propaganda within a matter of hours acknowledged President Thieu's 8 February announcement of the movement of South Vietnamese troops into Laos, the official

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protests in the form of government statements were not released until the 10th--the day after an NLHS Central Committee statement was issued. Both the DRV and PRG government statements duly endorse the NLHS statement condemning the aggression against Laos.

Both Vietnamese communist statements ridicule President Nixon's "trick" of having Thieu make the announcement; both say that this cannot hide the U.S. role and that the United States is violating the 1962 Geneva agreements. The PRG refers very briefly to the Vientiane government in "severely condemning the pro-American Vientiane administration for aiding the American aggressors and their henchmen." The DRV statement goes further with an implicit acknowledgment of the Laotian Government statement which regretted the incursion but placed primary responsibility on the DRV for its aggression against Laos. Thus the DRV statement says vaguely: "The Vientiane administration, through arguments that turn black into white, has striven to justify the Americans and Saigon puppet administration's encroachment on Laotian sovereignty"

Both government statements see the move against Laos as further evidence of U.S. intent to pursue a military course. Observing that within 10 months the Nixon Administration has expanded the war to two countries, Cambodia and Laos, the DRV statement says this proves that the Administration does not want peace and shows "the deceitful nature of the so-called five-point peace plan and all other initiatives." Like other propaganda, the statements reaffirm Indochinese solidarity and predict that "all strata" of the Laotian people will enter the struggle. Regarding any "new military adventure" against North Vietnam, the DRV statement "sternly warns" that the Vietnamese people, "with high vigilance," will certainly defeat any such adventure.

INITIAL REACTION TO
THIEU ANNOUNCEMENT

The first Vietnamese communist acknowledgment of President Thieu's announcement on the 8th came in a Liberation Radio broadcast at 1300 GMT, some 10 hours after Thieu's statement was broadcast by Saigon radio. The radio commentary, echoing earlier propaganda on rumored allied moves, declared cryptically that "before the indignation of public opinion, Nixon did not dare to directly order the attack against the Laotian liberated area but ordered Thieu to do it on the morning of 8 February." The commentary said that the "U.S. imperialists' frenzied act" can "in no way save the dangerous situation of the Vientiane reactionary clique," and it claimed that "the U.S. aggressors and their henchmen in Saigon, Phnom Penh, and Vientiane in the past year and early days of 1971" have suffered "pitiful setbacks."

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Another Liberation Radio commentary an hour later said everyone knows it is the United States that is responsible for the large-scale aggression, which is a "brazen" violation of the 1962 Geneva agreement. The commentary, of course, said nothing specifically about the nature and locus of the operation in remarking that "Nixon and the lackey clique have been making round-about and deceitful allegations on the nature, purpose, and duration of the military operations and the level of U.S. participation."

An LPA commentary on the 9th ridiculed the statements by the U.S. command in Saigon that no U.S. ground combat forces are involved in the Laos operation, saying "it is clear that this large-scale operation was schemed and staged and is being commanded by the United States with the direct participation of 9,000 U.S. troops of the 101st Airborne, Americal, and 5th Mechanized Infantry divisions. Like earlier comment, it scored the Vientiane administration, charging that "in the face of the serious U.S. acts of aggression against the Lao people, the Vientiane authorities, dancing to their U.S. master's tune, at first pretended to know nothing about the attack on southern Laos and even tried to plead for it."

The first DRV reaction came in a commentary broadcast by Hanoi radio within the hour after the second Liberation Radio commentary. In addition to noting Thieu's announcement of "the aggressive attack in Laos called Lam Son 719," it cited the MACV statement that the United States will provide any necessary air power--combat or logistical, aircraft or helicopters--to support the Saigon ground troops and air force. The broadcast added that after more than a week-long news embargo designed to ward off censure by public opinion, "Nixon resorted to the trick of having Thieu make the order public." It recalled that the Cambodian incursion was carried out under the "pretext" of destroying "communist" sanctuaries, and it said similar allegations are being made now.

Like the Front, Hanoi condemned the invasion as "trampling" on the sovereignty, independence, and neutrality of Laos and as a "new extremely serious violation of the 1962 Geneva agreements." Notably, however, the Hanoi broadcast went on to directly criticize Souvanna Phouma, saying that though aware beforehand, he "pretended to ignore and did not seek to prevent the action." It added that on the contrary, "he employed vile arguments to accuse the Vietnamese people of staging aggression against Laos."

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EARLIER DRV, PRG
PROTEST STATEMENTS

Hanoi's first official protest over the rumored ground action against Laos came in a DRV Foreign Ministry statement on the 5th, echoing and endorsing an NLHS Central Committee statement of the 4th. (The 1 February DRV Foreign Ministry statement had discussed only air power escalation in Indochina.) The Front government also endorsed the NLHS protest in a statement dated the 5th and carried by Front media on the 6th. Both the DRV and PRG statements use language similar to the Pathet Lao's in condemning the buildup of a large force of U.S. and Saigon troops. But while the DRV statement refers merely to carrying out "the plan of aggression against Laos on a larger scale," the PRG's claims that "large-scale aggressive attacks have been conducted against Laos."

The DRV statement differs from that of the PRG in its references to "extremist reactionaries" in the Vientiane administration as well as army, and in its claim that the U.S. "act of aggression" against Laos is "wrecking" the meeting between the representatives of the two princes in Laos and the NLHS' efforts to settle the Laotian problem peacefully.

Both the DRV and PRG statements are notable for their interjection of the notion that the concentration of larger forces in the area near the 17th parallel indicates that the United States is planning--in the words of VNA--"new military adventures against the DRV." Both statements also condemn the new ARVN operation in Cambodia.

PATHET LAO CONTINUES SERIES OF PROTESTS OVER ATTACKS ON LAOS

The first official communist protest following President Thieu's announcement on the 8th was the NLHS Central Committee statement--dated the 8th but broadcast on the 9th. It claims that the operation, involving "nearly 50 battalions," came in the wake of the United States and South Vietnam "having moved elements of their forces into Laotian territory since 1 February."* The

* Prior to Thieu's 8 February announcement there were a series of protests of allied actions, including the one from the NLHS Central Committee on the 4th which charged that large South Vietnamese and U.S. forces were conducting operations against Laos "in coordination with the Vientiane puppet army."

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statement condemns this "extremely serious escalation" of the war and describes Thieu's "claims about the space and time limits as well as the objectives of the operation" as "deceitful." It bluntly labels as "false" assertions "that no U.S. ground troops are taking part in this operation."

The statement calls on the Lao people to "punish" the invaders and defeat the operation, and it calls on other governments and people to "take strong and effective acts" against the "aggressors" and to demand that they put an end to the "brutal aggressive operation." According to the Pathet Lao news agency version, it also accuses the "Vientiane administration" of "pretending to protest" against the allied invasion while in fact "shielding this aggressive operation." This appears to be an allusion to the Laotian Government communique broadcast by Vientiane radio at 0530 GMT on the 8th--some two hours after Thieu's announcement. The communique requested the immediate withdrawal of all foreign troops from Laotian territory and asked the nations responsible for implementation of the Geneva agreements on Laos to take appropriate measures to assure compliance with the agreements. Expressing regret that "foreign troops of countries which signed the agreements" had decided "of their own accord to select Laotian territory as their battlefield," the communique placed "primary responsibility" for the current fighting on the DRV and its past and continuing violations of the agreements, but warned that "other foreign troops can in no way use this as an excuse to violate the borders of the kingdom of Laos."

An "urgent message" from Souphanouvong to Souvanna Phouma, also dated the 8th but not broadcast by the Pathet Lao radio until the 10th, scores the "new massive military invasion of Laos" by U.S. and South Vietnamese forces, "coordinating" with "Vientiane troops." Souphanouvong calls it "deplorable" that "Your Excellency also makes gestures and commits acts which the U.S. imperialists and lackeys might use to cover their war of aggression and fool public opinion both at home and abroad." He appeals to Souvanna to "take necessary measures to compel the warmongering U.S. imperialists and ultrarightist clique to immediately cease such barbarous acts of aggression."

In an earlier message to Souvanna, dated 2 February and broadcast on the 4th, Souphanouvong had called upon him to avoid being used by the "U.S. imperialists and lackeys" and claimed that the United States and Laotian rightists had "obstructed and delayed"

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the plenipotentiaries' meeting and were seeking "to destroy any NLHS attempt to peacefully settle the Laotian problem."

The allied operations in Laos are also denounced in a statement by the Patriotic Neutralist Forces Alliance Committee, dated the 9th and broadcast the next day, which expresses support for earlier NLHS statements and protests that allied actions undermine NLHS efforts to achieve a peaceful solution of the Laotian problem. An earlier statement from the committee, dated 4 February and broadcast on the 6th, had similarly charged that allied operations were sabotaging NLHS attempts to bring about a meeting between plenipotentiaries of the two Laotian princes to reach a peaceful settlement.

An NLHS Central Committee "appeal," dated the 7th and broadcast by Pathet Lao media two days later, called on the Lao people to unite and to "develop the powerful people's war" to drive out the "aggressors." It decried the "open armed invasion" as an "insolent challenge" to the Lao people, and it warned--uniquely--that Laotian territory is "not a battlefield favorable to the development of their modern armed forces." The appeal called upon signatories of the Geneva agreement on Laos to "condemn and protest" the invasion and to compel the aggressors "to stop the war escalation in Laos and immediately and totally withdraw."

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PRC FOREIGN MINISTRY STATEMENTS SCORE LAOS OPERATIONS

FOREIGN MINISTRY STATEMENT ON 8TH

A PRC Foreign Ministry statement on 8 February endorses the NLHS Central Committee statement of the 4th and echoes its condemnation of the "large-scale invasion of Laos." The foreign ministry statement, carried some 17 hours after the broadcast of Thieu's announcement of the allied operation, makes no mention of Thieu's official announcement but charges that the Nixon Administration has now ended efforts to "cover up its criminal scheme" and has "flagrantly invaded Laos." It asserts that the United States and its "lackeys in Saigon and Bangkok have dispatched armed forces in the tens of thousands to launch large-scale attacks on the southern areas of Laos from the air and on the ground."

It calls the "invasion" a "provocation" against the Chinese and other peoples--a formulation applied to U.S. actions in Indochina in the 13 December Chinese party-government statement supporting the 10 December DRV party-government appeal. The 4 May 1970 PRC Government statement assailing the U.S. incursion into Cambodia and the bombing of the DRV had similarly characterized these actions as provocations against the Chinese people.

Observing that "Laos is a close neighbor of China," the foreign ministry statement promises in standard terms to make "all-out efforts in giving support and assistance to the peoples of Laos, Vietnam, and Cambodia." The last previous official PRC statement on Laos, a foreign ministry statement on 26 March 1970, also noted that Laos is China's close neighbor but contained a warning that "the Chinese people absolutely will not sit idly by while U.S. imperialism acts wantonly in Laos"--a threat which had not been raised in Peking's elite pronouncements for some years and which has not been repeated since.*

The Chinese Foreign Ministry statement on the 8th does not mention the DRV Foreign Ministry and PRG statements of the 5th, but, like them, it scores the new South Vietnamese operation in Cambodia and raises the possibility of a threat to the DRV,

* See the 1 April 1970 TRENDS, pages 16-17, for a discussion of the 26 March 1970 PRC Foreign Ministry statement protesting intensified bombing of Laos and the introduction of "Thai accomplice troops."

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AFFAIRS articles in September 1969 and October 1968 Belyayev had supported Cairo's proposition that passage of Israeli ships through the canal should be dependent on settlement of the refugee question. (According to U.S. press reports--but not Cairo radio's 9 February account--an Egyptian official spokesman reaffirmed this position, declaring that passage of Israeli ships through the canal is included in the Security Council resolution but the refugee problem must be solved first.)

PRAVDA COMPLAINS OF U.S. ATTITUDE IN BIG FOUR TALKS

Moscow thus far has not acknowledged the 5 February State Department announcement that the United States has informed the USSR, Britain, and France of its **readiness to open preliminary discussion** on Big Four guarantees of a Middle East peace settlement at the four-power session on 12 February. While the Soviet proposals on a settlement--last set forth in the 15 October PRAVDA by Primakov--call for Big Four or Security Council guarantees, this aspect has been given little attention in routine propaganda. TASS on 1 February did report Averell Harriman as saying, in a speech in Florida, that his recent trip to Moscow convinced him "that the Soviet Union 'stands ready to join in effective four-power guarantees'" for a peaceful settlement.

PRAVDA on 10 February does, however, offer an unusual discussion of the Big Four role and berate the United States for its position in the four-power consultation, apparently without mentioning the U.S. proposal. TASS generally reports briefly on Big Four sessions, but only infrequently in the past several months has Moscow touched on a four-power role in a settlement: Kudryavtsev in August, for example, called on the four to promote a settlement and said Jarring's mission should be given a "practical program of action," and Gromyko in his 21 October UNGA address, after referring to the Jarring mission, said the four powers must contribute to a settlement.

Now PRAVDA's New York correspondent Kolesnichenko, as reported by TASS on the 10th, says that "UN informed circles" point out that the United States refuses to discuss "substantial questions" of a political settlement in the Big Four sessions. Noting that the American press says the United States is making efforts through "so-called 'quiet diplomacy'" to eliminate the crisis, Kolesnichenko charges that Washington is actually blocking the work of the Big Four and would like to doom the consultations to failure. In view of the cease-fire extension and the "new

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emerging situation," giving the United States a "real possibility" to display quiet diplomacy, Kolesnichenko says it should be expected that the Americans would not oppose "adoption of coordinated decisions" aimed at securing the earliest political settlement. He particularly complains that at the four-power meeting on 4 February the U.S. representative opposed the opinion of the other three, and turned down Soviet and French proposals, on a coordinated statement stressing the need for full implementation of Resolution 242 and particularly the need for Israeli withdrawal.

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charging that the United States is "wildly plotting to launch a sudden attack on Laos and Vietnam." The statement maintains that "such rabid act, on the part of the Nixon Government can only arouse the Laotian people and the other peoples of Indochina to even more resolute resistance and hasten its thorough defeat."

FOREIGN MINISTRY
STATEMENT ON 4TH

Peking's first official denunciation of the concentration of allied troops on the Laotian border came in a PRC Foreign Ministry statement on the 4th which led off with an attack on Secretary Rogers' 29 January press conference remarks: It cited the Secretary as saying that there would be no limit on U.S. air operations in Indochina and that the United States would not foreclose any possibility of other action. The statement went on to charge that "in the past few days" U.S. and South Vietnamese forces have been concentrated on the Laotian border, Thai troops "directed by the United States" have acted in coordination, and "in order to cover the invasion of Laos" by South Vietnamese and Thai forces the U.S. air force has been carrying out concentrated bombing on the southern areas of Laos. The statement maintained that public opposition caused the Administration to black out news but that the "premeditated" nature of the new "military adventure" is well known and can be demonstrated by the existence of a "secret agreement" between Saigon and the "Laotian rightist troops" on the entry of South Vietnamese troops into Laos.

The 4 February statement endorsed statements by the NLHS Central Committee spokesman on allied incursions and the DRV Foreign Ministry on U.S. air strikes escalation, both on 1 February, and by the PRG Foreign Ministry and a spokesman for Sihanouk's government (RGNU) on operations in Laos, on the 2d and 3d, respectively. It predicted that "U.S. imperialism" will "suffer even more severe punishment" by the Indochinese people and reaffirmed that it is China's duty to give all-out support and assistance, adding that the Chinese people "absolutely will not allow U.S. imperialism to do whatever it pleases in Indochina."

REACTION TO
INCURSION

Peking's first explicit reaction to the incursion into Laos came in an NCNA dispatch on the 9th charging that the United States on the day before had dispatched "large numbers of U.S. and South Vietnamese puppet troops to invade the liberated zone in southern Laos on a large scale." The dispatch laid the responsibility for the move

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on the United States, citing State Department spokesman McCloskey as having "admitted" that President Nixon made the basic decision. A subsequent NCNA report, dated the 10th, mentioned that the United States and "the Thieu-Ky clique" had announced the incursion, but Peking has otherwise ignored Thieu's announcement in favor of concentrating on the U.S. role in "masterminding" the action.

The NCNA report on the 10th, enumerating the "fallacies" in the 8 February State Department statement, suppressed several key points in the statement. While responding to the points that no American combat troops will enter Laos, that the operation will be a limited one, that it is designed to protect American lives, that it is consistent with international law, and that the United States has consistently sought to end the Indochina conflict through negotiations, NCNA's account failed to mention the statement's reference to sanctuaries and supply routes as the target of the action, and it ignored all references to the Geneva accords and machinery. NCNA interpreted the statement's reiteration of President Nixon's five-point proposal of last October as reflecting an intention to "make the three Indochinese peoples surrender in face of the military pressure" of the United States. NCNA all but ignored the statement's assertion that the operation is fully consistent with international law, a claim dismissed as "not worth a word of refutation."

PRC media's only mention of the Geneva conference machinery appeared in an NCNA dispatch on the 9th quoting a statement by the spokesman of the DRV delegation at the Paris talks denouncing the British Government for having declared its support of the incursion into Laos.* The dispatch quoted the DRV statement as taking note of Britain's cochairmanship of the 1962 Geneva conference and blaming the Conservative government for cooperating with the United States in undermining the 1962 agreements. In Peking's own reaction to the British Government's statement supporting the operation in Laos, an NCNA report on the 9th avoided any mention of the Geneva conference. It did, however, acknowledge the charge made in the statement that North Vietnamese troops were in Laos. In contrast to the attack on Britain, NCNA on the 9th favorably quoted French President Pompidou

* While Peking only occasionally mentions the Paris talks, there is a recent precedent for its publicizing statements by the communist delegations at the talks: On 26 November Peking publicized the delegations' statements announcing the postponement of the session of the Paris talks scheduled for that week.

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on Laos, including his remark that "there will be no settlement and no peace in Southeast Asia without cessation of all foreign intervention."

In the most authoritative Chinese comment since the 8 February foreign ministry statement, a PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article on the 10th repeated the foreign ministry's charges regarding allied operations in Laos and Cambodia as well as the warning about a surprise attack on North Vietnam. Expressing confidence that the people of Laos, Vietnam, and Cambodia are "strong enough" to defeat the allies, Commentator renewed the standard pledge that the Chinese provide a "powerful backing" and "all-out support" for the Indochinese people in their struggle.

MOSCOW COMMENT, KOSYGIN DEPLORE "ESCALATION" IN INDOCHINA

Soviet media have stepped up their propaganda attacks on U.S. Indochina policy following Kosygin's 2 February call for world public opinion to condemn allied activity in Laos and the 3 February TASS statement's denunciation of the "armed intrusion" into Laos. Moscow publicizes voluminous reports of protest meetings in the USSR and abroad and culls statements critical of the allied action from the foreign press. In continuing at the same time to call for a negotiated settlement and expressing general support for the Indochinese peoples, the comment hews closely to the language of the TASS statement.

Against the background of the TASS statement and Kosygin's earlier charge on 1 February that "an outrageous invasion of Laos is underway," Moscow media obscured the date of the 8 February South Vietnamese crossover into Laos. Soviet media's first reaction to the GVN announcement came in a TASS Washington dispatch at 0832 GMT on the 8th which said U.S. military authorities "confirmed reports of the invasion of Laos by American-Saigon troops" but gave no date.

A subsequent, longer TASS dispatch from New York took note of Thieu's statement. It reported that the United States "officially admitted the fact of armed incursion into the territory of neutral Laos" and added that "their mouthpiece, puppet Saigon 'president' Thieu, declared that South Vietnamese troops supported by the U.S. Air Force had invaded the territory of Laos." TASS did not elaborate on the substance of Thieu's statement. It did, however, note "Saigon" reports that the operation was "designed for a period

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of from 10 days to one month." It went on to denounce "the criminal aggression of the United States in Indochina," which it said has "entered a new dangerous stage," and to warn vaguely that "the U.S. Administration has assumed heavy responsibility to world and American public opinion for its aftermath."

An editorial in PRAVDA on the 8th, as reported by Radio Moscow and TASS, charged the United States with escalating the war "on all fronts of Indochina." It cited as evidence reports that the U.S. air raids on South Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos "are now on a scale without equal at any time in the Indochina war." At the same time, it added, "tens of thousands of soldiers in the army of Washington's Saigon henchmen have, with American air and naval support, been moved into Cambodia and Laos." PRAVDA also noted that "in the northern part of South Vietnam nearly 30,000 American and Saigon troops have begun the biggest punitive operation in the past 10 months on the borders with the DRV and with Laos."

To judge from American press reports, the PRAVDA editorial said, "the Pentagon is planning a further escalation of its criminal war." Without elaborating on these "plans," it went on to charge that "new U.S. aggressive actions in Indochina are a brazen violation of the U.N. Charter, an affront to international law, and a breach of the 1954 and 1962 Geneva agreements." After calling in standard terms for a political settlement in Indochina, PRAVDA concluded with a quotation from the 3 February TASS statement: "The Vietnamese, Laotians, and Cambodians have the unflagging and determined support of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries."

Other Moscow comment has taken Britain and the United States to task for their attitudes toward the Geneva accords. A TASS commentary by Kharkov on the 8th assailed London for supporting the allied action in Laos. Without mentioning Moscow's own role in the Geneva accords, Kharkov said that "the British Government, being a cochairman of the Geneva conference on Laos, cannot but know that the American-Saigon aggression against the Laotian people is a most flagrant violation of the 1962 accords." It added that "instead of pressing for an implicit fulfillment of these agreements which guaranteed Laos neutrality, independence, and territorial integrity, London assumes the unseemly mission of an apologist of America's sanguinary banditry."

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An article by Mayevskiy in PRAVDA on the 10th, as reported by TASS, charged that the "invasion of Laos by U.S. military and Saigon puppets is a shameless trampling underfoot of international law; it is an outrage against the principles of the UN Charter and the Geneva agreements signed by the United States." The "State Department statement on Laos," Mayevskiy added, is "nothing else but an effort to justify brigandage" and raises the question: "What are U.S. signatures under international documents really worth?"

KOSYGIN'S MEETING WITH LE THANH NGHI According to Radio Moscow, Premier Kosygin "received" DRV Politburo member and Deputy Premier Le Thanh Nghi on 10 February and had "a cordial and comradely talk" with him. The radio added that Le Thanh Nghi "spoke of the aggravation of the situation in Indochina, emphasizing the dangerous nature of the actions of U.S. imperialism directed at broadening the aggression in Laos and Cambodia and at organizing new provocations against the DRV."

In language more restrained than his remarks on Laos on 1 and 2 February, Kosygin, the radio said, "condemned the intrusion of American-Saigon troops into Laos, their outrages in Cambodia, and the constant violation of DRV territory." The radio's account cited no direct response by Kosygin to Le Thanh Nghi's charge that the United States is organizing "new provocations" against the DRV. The Soviet Premier stated that the government of the USSR "resolutely condemns the aggressive actions of the United States in Indochina," the broadcast said, and "once again confirmed the determination of the Soviet Union to afford all-sided support to the DRV in repelling imperialist aggression and in building socialism." As usual, there was no elaboration on the form this "all-sided support" would take.

TASS reported the day before that Le Thanh Nghi, "who stopped over in Moscow," met with Deputy Premier Novikov on the 9th for a "friendly talk." On the same day, it added, the two deputy premiers signed an agreement on "the Soviet Union's additional technical assistance to the DRV."

During a January-February tour of Soviet bloc countries, the DRV official was reported by bloc media to have signed agreements with Hungary, Poland, and East Germany. The last monitored report of Le Thanh Nghi's whereabouts prior to the 9 February TASS report on his presence in Moscow was a 4 February Radio Sofia item saying that he had "left" the country following a "vacation." The report did not indicate his destination.

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TASS ON PRC
STATEMENT

On 9 February TASS reported the PRC Foreign Ministry statement supporting the Pathet Lao statement of the 4th, including the Chinese pledge to give "every possible assistance and support" to the Indochinese peoples. But TASS did not mention the Chinese charges that the United States is "plotting to launch a sudden attack on the DRV" and that the American incursion is "a grave provocation not only against the three peoples of Indochina but against the Chinese people and the people of the whole world as well." Moscow has reported Chinese statements on Vietnam in the past: TASS in English and Russian reported the 13 December Chinese statement on the 10 December DRV joint party-government appeal.

Moscow's publicity for the PRC statement accords with the Soviet propaganda appeal for the Chinese to join in the "anti-imperialist" movement. But while thus seeking to demonstrate Soviet concern for unity in its propaganda for general consumption, Moscow has continued in its broadcasts to the PRC to accuse the Chinese of sabotaging united action and playing into the hands of the United States on Indochina. A 9 February broadcast to the Chinese charged, for example, that while the United States is escalating the war in that area and "cannons are thundering and bombs are dropping near the PRC frontier," the Chinese leadership is limiting its response to "verbal" assaults on imperialism and is committed to a policy of "doing nothing in particular" in Indochina. China's "commitment to nonintervention in Vietnam," the broadcast added, has encouraged "U.S. militarists to think that they will not be punished for their currently escalating aggression in Indochina."

Moscow has ignored State Department press spokesman McCloskey's 8 February remarks that the action in Laos would pose no threat to the Soviet Union or the PRC and that it remains U.S. policy to improve relations with both countries.

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DRV SCORES U.S. STRIKES IN DMZ, QUANG BINH, LISTS "WAR CRIMES"

A series of DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's statements issued on 5, 6, and 9 February "sternly condemn" alleged U.S. bombings against the demilitarized zone (DMZ) and Quang Binh Province, as usual terming them "acts of war."

The protest on the 5th "sternly denounced" what it called "fresh bombings of areas in the northern part of the DMZ." It claimed that on 31 January and 1 and 3 February, the United States "again sent many aircraft, including B-52's, to drop many demolition and steel pellet bombs on Huong Lap village" and that "at the same time, U.S. artillery from south of the DMZ fired on Vinh Son village," both of which "lie north of the 17th parallel in the DMZ belonging to DRV territory."

The same targets--Huong Lap and Vinh Son villages--are listed in the protest of the 6th, while that of the 9th protests alleged bombings against only Huong Lap. Both protests echo the spokesman on the 5th in charging that B-52's and artillery were used against the targets--on the 4th, according to the statement of the 6th, and successively from 5-7 February, according to the one on the 9th.

The foreign ministry spokesman on 6 February makes the additional charge that on 4 February U.S. planes "fired rockets at an area in Quang Binh Province" and says the Vietnamese armed forces and people are "determined to appropriately punish" all U.S. encroachments and "war acts" against the DRV--a warning perhaps directed at the admitted U.S. action above the DMZ.*

WAR CRIMES VNA on 9 February releases a DRV War Crimes COMMUNIQUE Commission communique on alleged U.S. war crimes in both North and South Vietnam during January, calling them evidence of U.S. preparations for "new military adventures to intensify and expand the war to the whole of Indochina." In addition to routine charges of U.S. crimes in South Vietnam, the communique says that "using South Vietnam

* The U.S. Command announced in Saigon on 5 February that a U.S. F-105 fighter-bomber on the 4th fired two Shrike missiles at a North Vietnamese antiaircraft installation about 30 miles north of the DMZ. The strikes were described as "protective reaction."

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as a springboard," the United States "threw tens of thousands of puppet troops" in coordination with U.S. forces against Cambodia and Laos in late January and early February.

In the context of crimes against North Vietnam, the communique cites no further documentation of the U.S. attitude Secretary Rogers' 29 January remark that the United States "would use its air power without restriction at any place in Indochina." Charging that the Nixon Administration continued to "encroach on the DRV's sovereignty and security," the communique asserts that the United States also "went on with its bellicose and saucy threats" against the Vietnamese, Lao, and Cambodian peoples. It routinely enumerates U.S. reconnaissance actions over the North as well as alleged air strikes in the DMZ and northern provinces as crimes against the DRV.

REPORTS OF PARIS TALKS PLAY DOWN COMMENT ON LAOS, POW ISSUE

The VNA and LPA accounts of the communist delegates' statements at the 101st session of the Paris talks on 4 February--drastically truncated in comparison to the actual texts--obscure their detailed discussion of the developing Laos situation and of the "escalation" in Cambodia. This treatment is in keeping with the frequently abbreviated reports of the delegates' statements, and thus would not appear to be of undue significance. The statements themselves were in line with Vietnamese communist propaganda on Laos at the time of the session.

Thus the VNA and LPA accounts of the session suggest that PRG delegate Mme. Nguyen Thi Binh concentrated on scoring the President's Vietnamization program and on vilifying the GVN for helping to carry it out. Neither account notes her detailed presentation of charges against the United States in Cambodia and Laos.

Similarly, the VNA account ignores DRV delegate Xuan Thuy's specific charges against the United States with respect to Cambodia and Laos. It does report that Thuy, "after recalling the latest U.S. acts aimed at prolonging and expanding the war in Cambodia and Laos," charged that the Nixon doctrine--to which Thuy devoted half his statement--"has now been laid bare as one aimed at making aggression with new methods, using Asians to fight Asians, under U.S. command, with U.S. material supplies, air and naval support, not excluding the support of U.S. ground forces."

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The VNA account does note that in their additional remarks, Mme. Binh and Xuan Thuy "laid bare the tortuous contentions of the United States and its puppets and sternly condemned the latter's aggression in Laos and war expansion and intensification throughout Indochina."

The VNA account notes the buildup of allied forces in the northern part of South Vietnam in charging that U.S. Ambassador Bruce "tried to distort the grave situation caused by the United States in Laos in an attempt to cover up the concentration of tens of thousands of U.S. and Saigon troops along the Vietnamese-Lao border in preparation for an aggression against Laos."

VNA also carefully records the fact that both communist delegates in standard terms called for the Nixon Administration to engage seriously in the Paris talks.

POW ISSUE VNA says that at the session the "delegate of the Thieu-Ky-Khieu clique merely repeated old contentions about the so-called 'cease-fire' and 'prisoners of war' questions." Thus it gives no indication that GVN delegate Lam put on the Paris record the proposal by GVN Foreign Minister Lam that the GVN and North Vietnam immediately release all sick and wounded prisoners of war, including American airmen held in the North. The proposal was made on 26 January at a press conference following the 24 January GVN release of 37 disabled North Vietnamese prisoners.* (The VNA account of the 94th session on 10 December similarly had given no indication of the nature of the allied proposal for the immediate release of all North Vietnamese prisoners held in the South in exchange for GVN, U.S., and other allied prisoners.)

The VNA account made no reference at all to the fact that Ambassador Bruce also raised the POW issue, challenging the communists to fulfill their obligations to sick and wounded prisoners or face continued condemnation.

* See the TRENDS of 27 January, pages 11-12.

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HANOI, PEKING BELATEDLY REPORT SIHANOUK VISIT TO DRV

Hanoi on 9 February provides the first public confirmation of a two-week Sihanouk visit to North Vietnam.* VNA announced that he arrived in Hanoi on 26 January for a "friendly visit" at the invitation of DRV President Ton Duc Thang. According to VNA, Sihanouk was welcomed by Thang, Le Duan, Truong Chinh, Pham Van Dong, Vo Nguyen Giap, and other DRV leaders. Another VNA report noted that Sihanouk held "many talks and exchanges of viewpoints" with President Thang and "other state leaders." The exchanges were held, according to VNA, in an "atmosphere full of militant solidarity, fraternal friendship, and complete mutual confidence" and the two sides "achieved a unanimity of views on all problems raised."

An NCNA report datelined 9 February announced Sihanouk's return to the Chinese capital that day. Among the Chinese leaders greeting him at the airport were Chou En-lai, Chief of Staff Huang Yung-sheng, Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien, and Deputy Chief of Staff Wu Fa-hsien.

* Sihanouk's last visit to the DRV, from 25 May to 8 June 1970, was discussed in the 10 June 1970 TRENDS, pages 7 and 8.

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MIDDLE EAST

MOSCOW WELCOMES UAR CEASE-FIRE EXTENSION, SUEZ PROPOSAL

In a low volume of comment on UAR President as-Sadat's 4 February speech to the National Assembly, Moscow welcomes Cairo's "peaceful initiative" in extending the cease-fire for another 30 days, until 7 March, and in proposing a "partial" withdrawal of Israeli forces from the east bank of the Suez Canal and UAR preparations to reopen the canal for international navigation. Noting favorable European reaction and "pessimistic" U.S. press comment, Moscow says the world has the right to expect a favorable reply from Israel, and it again complains that Tel Aviv refuses to discuss the essential questions of withdrawal and recognition of Palestinian rights. Prime Minister Golda Meir's remarks in a recent NBC interview are construed as a rejection of the Suez proposal, Israel refusing "to undertake even a partial troop withdrawal" from the canal. In terse acknowledgment of Mrs. Meir's 9 February speech to the Knesset, TASS that day says Israel has declined the UAR "peace initiative" and reports only--citing UPI--that Mrs. Meir said the UAR proposal is unacceptable to Israel.

**CEASE-FIRE
EXTENSION** The brief TASS account of as-Sadat's speech noted that the UAR decided to "refrain from resumption of fire" for another 30 days in response to appeals by U Thant and the world public; it did not mention his request that U Thant make a progress report to the Security Council before the expiration of this period. *PRAVDA*'s Belyayev, participating in the 7 February domestic service commentators' roundtable, said the agreement on extension was explained by as-Sadat as a response to approaches by U Thant "and other member countries of the Security Council." Panelist Kudryavtsev, underlining the difference between a cease-fire and peace, commented that there is great danger in the "very indefiniteness" of the situation. Pointing up the propaganda theme that Middle East tension impedes the Arabs' peaceful development, and in effect linking this to the Suez proposal, he added that "such an indeterminate state of affairs paralyzes the possibility of settling a number of vital questions" for the Arab countries, such as the problem of rebuilding Egyptian towns on the canal.

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PROPOSAL ON SUEZ

Commentators hail as-Sadat's proposal for a "partial" Israeli withdrawal--not further clarified--and preparations to reopen the canal as a "new real opportunity" for achieving a political settlement and a "concrete and realistic initiative."* Where as-Sadat called such a withdrawal a "first stage of a timetable that will be prepared later" to implement other provisions of Security Council Resolution 242, TASS' account of the speech on the 4th said only that the UAR would regard this as a first step toward implementation of the resolution. Moscow's only recent reference to a timetable appeared in a 4 February domestic service commentary by Ryzhikov which cited Israeli leaders as saying they are ready to fight rather than to fulfill Resolution 242, "or at least to set forth a timetable for the withdrawal of Israeli troops" from all occupied territories.

Soviet propagandists employ the standard line that only the oil companies and large shipowners benefit from the canal's closure, while many European and Asian countries have sustained losses. In a domestic service commentary on the 8th, Kudryavtsev called reopening of the canal "one of the most urgent problems" of international navigation and trade communications and said it would help improve the political atmosphere in the Middle East as well as answer the interests of many European and Asian countries. Perhaps presaging as-Sadat's Suez proposal, ASU Secretary General an-Nur had been reported by TASS on the 3d as declaring in a Cairo television program that the interests of the Common Market countries and Britain were closely related to the normal functioning of the Suez Canal, which in turn "is linked with the elimination of the consequences of the Israeli aggression." (The MIDDLE EAST NEWS AGENCY report of an-Nur's interview failed to include these remarks on Suez.)

Moscow has not touched on the question of Israeli use of the Suez Canal, referring only to restoration of "normal international" navigation. However, PRAVDA's Belyayev, in the commentators' roundtable on the 7th, observed that the Arab capitals are talking of the need for a just solution of the Palestinian refugee problem and of "freedom of navigation in the Gulf of Aqaba and the Suez Canal." This remark also provides the only current propaganda suggestion of a linkage between the refugee and navigation issues; in INTERNATIONAL

* Moscow never acknowledged Western and Israeli press reports over the last few months of various suggestions, attributed to Israeli Defense Minister Dayan, regarding demilitarization or mutual thinning out of troops on both sides of the canal.

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AFFAIRS articles in September 1969 and October 1968 Belyayev had supported Cairo's proposition that passage of Israeli ships through the canal should be dependent on settlement of the refugee question. (According to U.S. press reports--but not Cairo radio's 9 February account--an Egyptian official spokesman reaffirmed this position, declaring that passage of Israeli ships through the canal is included in the Security Council resolution but the refugee problem must be solved first.)

PRAVDA COMPLAINS OF U.S. ATTITUDE IN BIG FOUR TALKS

Moscow thus far has not acknowledged the 5 February State Department announcement that the United States has informed the USSR, Britain, and France of its **readiness to open preliminary** discussion on Big Four guarantees of a Middle East peace settlement at the four-power session on 12 February. While the Soviet proposals on a settlement--last set forth in the 15 October PRAVDA by Primakov--call for Big Four or Security Council guarantees, this aspect has been given little attention in routine propaganda. TASS on 1 February did report Averell Harriman as saying, in a speech in Florida, that his recent trip to Moscow convinced him "that the Soviet Union 'stands ready to join in effective four-power guarantees'" for a peaceful settlement.

PRAVDA on 10 February does, however, offer an unusual discussion of the Big Four role and berate the United States for its position in the four-power consultation, apparently without mentioning the U.S. proposal. TASS generally reports briefly on Big Four sessions, but only infrequently in the past several months has Moscow touched on a four-power role in a settlement: **Kudryavtsev** in August, for example, called on the four to promote a settlement and said Jarring's mission should be given a "practical program of action," and Gromyko in his 21 October UNGA address, after referring to the Jarring mission, said the four powers must contribute to a settlement.

Now PRAVDA's New York correspondent Kolesnichenko, as reported by TASS on the 10th, says that "UN informed circles" point out that the United States refuses to discuss "substantial questions" of a political settlement in the Big Four sessions. Noting that the American press says the United States is making efforts through "so-called 'quiet diplomacy'" to eliminate the crisis, Kolesnichenko charges that Washington is actually blocking the work of the Big Four and would like to doom the consultations to failure. In view of the cease-fire extension and the "new

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emerging situation," giving the United States a "real possibility" to display quiet diplomacy, Kolesnichenko says it should be expected that the Americans would not oppose "adoption of coordinated decisions" aimed at securing the earliest political settlement. He particularly complains that at the four-power meeting on 4 February the U.S. representative opposed the opinion of the other three, and turned down Soviet and French proposals, on a coordinated statement stressing the need for full implementation of Resolution 242 and particularly the need for Israeli withdrawal.

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SALT

PRAVDA RAISES SUBSTANTIVE SALT ISSUE; IZVESTIYA ATTACKS SMITH

A 3 February article in PRAVDA by V. Shestov departed from Moscow's past propaganda practice by discussing, and so identifying, a substantive question at issue in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT). The article denounced the position--ascribed to "the U.S. press" and said to reflect the interests of "the American militarists"--that the negotiations "should not affect" U.S. forward bases. Three days later, a dispatch in IZVESTIYA by the paper's Washington correspondent broke another Soviet propaganda practice by criticizing U.S. delegation head Gerard Smith. The brief dispatch, directly responsive to U.S. press reports of Smith's testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on 3 February, broached another contentious issue in remarking on Smith's reportedly "negative" approach to the "practical" idea of confining an agreement to the limitation of ABM systems.

PRAVDA ARTICLE Signed by V. Shestov, the author of past Soviet comment on disarmament and military strategic issues,* the PRAVDA article directed its fire at "forces . . . firmly entrenched on the banks of the Potomac" who are interested in "casting aspersions" on SALT and "fanning distrust toward the position of the Soviet Union." In this context Shestov complained that the U.S. press "is practically breaking its back trying to prove that the negotiations allegedly should not affect the American nuclear means that have been brought near the Soviet borders and the borders of other socialist countries"--an effort reflecting the desire of "American militarists" to gain "one-sided advantages" in the talks. Soviet media had not reported Defense Minister Grechko's remark a week earlier during a visit to Finland, cited in the Western press, that SALT had been unproductive because the negotiations "were not based on a desire for equal rights."

* An article by Shestov in the June 1969 issue of INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS contained Soviet media's first substantive discussion of U.S. development of multiple independently targeted reentry vehicles (MIRV) and the implications for U.S.-Soviet relations. See the FBIS SURVEY of 19 June 1969, pages 1-2.

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Elaborating on the charge that the United States was seeking one-sided advantages, Shestov cited in particular the increase in military expenditures for further deployment of the Safeguard ABM system, the accelerated equipping of ICBM's with "multiple warhead MIRV charges," the modernizing of U.S. military bases worldwide, and the strengthening of the U.S. navy. Arguing that "a mutually acceptable agreement on the limitation of offensive strategic armament can be reached only on the basis of observing the principle of security for both sides and ruling out one-sided military advantages," he declared that the U.S. "line of intensifying military preparations" is "incompatible with a constructive approach to SALT."*

Concluding with a recollection of Kosygin's year-end statement to ASAHI on Soviet interest in achieving a "reasonable agreement in the sphere of limiting strategic armaments," Shestov returned to the equal-security theme: "Realistic measures aimed at limiting armament and aimed at disarmament . . . can be implemented only by observing the conditions of equal security for all countries," he said, and the proponents of such a "sober approach" could count on the unwavering efforts of the Soviet Union.

IZVESTIYA The **IZVESTIYA** dispatch of 6 February by the paper's
ON SMITH Washington correspondent, Yuriy Barsukov, cited U.S. press reports as saying Ambassador Smith sought in his closed-door testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the 3d to "prove why the United States should not conclude, as a separate initial measure, an agreement on limitation of defensive types of strategic armaments." Calling this a "strange" stand, Barsukov said that there was in fact "much interest" in such an agreement among U.S. political and scientific circles and that the Senators who heard Smith's testimony were "puzzled at his 'extremely negative' approach to such a practical step."

Barsukov remarked on the "rather peculiar situation" in which chief negotiator Smith, the person "authorized to carry out talks" and "to search ways toward agreement on limitation of defensive and offensive strategic armaments," should be attempting to

* The last major Soviet press comment on SALT, a PRAVDA Observer article on 7 March 1970, had sharply attacked Secretary Laird for urging the buildup of strategic arms systems, including Safeguard, but did not charge in so many words that Laird's stand was inconsistent with efforts to reach an agreement at SALT. Observer simply asked whether "forces" that did not want an agreement on strategic arms limitation were not influencing Laird's position and added that this question was being asked increasingly in the U.S. press.

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"discards Senator from serious consideration" of a proposal which would do just that.

OTHER COMMENT Other, more routine Soviet propaganda has followed up on some general themes of the PRAVDA article but has not brought up the forward bases issue again or echoed Baranov's critical remarks on Ambassador Smith.

A foreign-language talk over Radio Moscow on 6 February pointed to "attempts of U.S. diplomacy to gain one-sided advantages" and remarked that this could not "facilitate the success" of SALT, but stated that the Soviet delegation was guided by a desire to reach an agreement and that "the fact that the talks are in progress in itself a positive phenomenon."

Some comment on President Nixon's proposed budget has brought up SALT. Thus a 29 January TASS report said the President's budget message "makes it clear that the United States intends to act, as before, from 'positions of strength' in settling major international issues" and that "after stating the U.S. desire to continue" SALT, the President "stressed at the same time that the United States' main task is to strengthen the rocket-nuclear forces." The message, TASS added without elaboration, put "a strong emphasis" on "the development of new types of weapons."

In the 7 February domestic service commentators' roundtable program, IZVESTIYA observer Matveyev remarked that it was "pertinent to ask what effect" the proposed budget would have on the strategic arms limitation talks. He went on to recall Brezhnev's statement in Kharkov on 14 April 1970 that "to any attempts by anyone to gain military superiority over the Soviet Union, we will reply with whatever increase of military might is necessary to guarantee our defense. We cannot do otherwise." Matveyev did not pursue the question of the impact on SALT.

TASS on 28 January transmitted in English a report of a New York DAILY WORLD article on alleged Defense Department efforts to expand from a four-site to a 12-site missile defense system--the "larger goal," the paper was quoted as saying, being preparation of "an anti-Soviet missile offensive for the destruction of socialism." The TASS Russian service did not carry this item, however, and it has not appeared in monitored Soviet radio broadcasts.

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SPACE FLIGHTS

SOVIET STRESS APOLLO DIFFICULTIES, HAIL LUNA AND VENUS MISSIONS

Soviet coverage of the 31 January-9 February flight of Apollo 14 has consisted of a few brief factual reports on the progress of the flight and the activities of the astronauts, with emphasis on technical malfunctions and other difficulties. This reportage has been counterpoised to a predictably larger volume of propaganda on Luna 17 and on Venus 7--which, as revealed for the first time by TASS on 26 January, made a soft landing on Venus on 15 December and briefly transmitted data back to earth.

In a volume of propaganda comparable to the Soviet coverage of Apollo 12 and slightly less than the amount devoted to the ill-fated Apollo 13 mission, Soviet media reported the developments in the flight of Apollo 14 with particular reference to the initial docking problem, a "slight fault on the control panel" of the lunar module, and "faults in the communications system" of Shepard's back-pack. Comment on the moon walks stressed that the astronauts were "hindered by very difficult terrain," that they "lagged behind their schedule," that at one point they "lost their way," and that their high pulse rates and rising space-suit temperatures forced them to return to the lunar module. One commentary observed that "when the astronauts reached the lunar module, they could hardly keep on their feet" and "with great difficulty they climbed the steps of the ladder and shut the hatch behind them." TASS on the 9th quoted U.S. scientists as admitting that they had "estimated the possibilities of the astronauts far too optimistically."

A domestic service commentary on 8 February said U.S. scientists did not "conceal their disappointment" that the astronauts "did not succeed in carrying out one of the basic tasks of the program--to climb the ridge of the cone crater and take soil specimens there." The astronauts, the commentary said, "did all they could, all that was humanly possible. Alas, lunar conditions proved poorly suited to the activity of man."

Soviet media have predictably exploited the concurrent exploits and capabilities of Luna 17--reactivated on 6 February for its fourth lunar day--to contrast manned space flight unfavorably with automated exploration. In a PRAVDA interview, reported by

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TASS and in Moscow's domestic service on the 6th, the chief designer of Luna 17 noted that since the 17 November landing of Luna 17 on the moon "not a single one of its numerous instruments, mechanisms, and assemblies" has broken down. He remarked that the Apollo flights would undoubtedly "go down in the history of space exploration" but noted that "huge sums" had been spent on the manned flights and that there had been "risk to human life," whereas "most of the tasks facing them could be solved by automatons." He expressed the view that "the appearance of man on the planets is justified when the possibilities of automatic machines are exhausted to a significant degree."

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USSR - CUBA

MOSSOW, HAVANA ANNOUNCE SOVIET SHIPS TO VISIT CUBAN PORTS

Soviet media on 4 February and Cuban media the next day announced briefly that a group of Soviet ships will visit Cuban ports this month. There were variations and inconsistencies in the description of the vessels: Radio Moscow and TASS versions said the detachment includes an antisubmarine vessel, a submarine, and a tanker, but where Radio Moscow in an English broadcast described a fourth vessel as "a floating base" and used the term again ("playbaza") in a domestic service newscast, TASS English called it a "mother ship"--the same term used by Havana ("buque madre"). Neither the Soviet nor the Cuban reports mentioned anything that indicated the presence of a guided missile cruiser, cited in U.S. press reports of a 5 February Defense Department statement on the vessels' movement toward Cuba. The last publicized Soviet naval detachment to visit Cuba, in December 1970, was said by both Moscow and Havana to consist of an antisubmarine ship, a submarine, and a tanker.

In announcing the plans for the December visit Havana said the Soviet ships would remain in Cuban waters from the 7th to the 23d, but on 28 December Havana television showed film clips of a group of sailors from the ships cutting sugar cane on a plantation in the "regional district" of the port of Cienfuegos. This time Havana followed Moscow's lead in specifying no dates. Neither in December nor during the earlier visit of a Soviet naval detachment in September 1970 did Moscow or Havana report any of the movements of the Soviet ships between Cuban ports, and in neither instance did the media report their final departure.

Unlike the announcements in December, the Soviet and Cuban reports this time noted that the vessels are on a training cruise, and Moscow underscored the idea that nothing remarkable is afoot by calling it a "routine" training voyage. Unlike Havana but in keeping with the Soviet reports in December, Moscow also stipulated that the calls at Cuban ports will be "business calls."

BACKGROUND In reacting last fall to the public U.S. speculation that the Soviet Union might be building a strategic nuclear submarine base at Cienfuegos, an authorized TASS denial on 13 October and surrounding comment insisted on the right of Soviet

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vessels to call at Cuban ports. The TASS statement declared that if Soviet ships enter foreign ports, "including ports of the Republic of Cuba," they do so with the consent of the host governments and exercise "an inalienable right of sovereign states." IZVESTIYA's authoritative commentator Matveyev wrote on 10 October that calls of Soviet ships at Cuban ports accord with "the normal, accepted practice for all states possessing a fleet."

The subject has been largely dormant in Soviet propaganda since mid-November, when a flurry of commentaries pressed the line that the charges about construction of a Soviet base were contrived to build up pressure for bigger military appropriations and were part of a general effort by the Nixon Administration to aggravate international tensions and bring about a return to the cold war. It was in the latter context that the Cuban base issue was last brought up in available Soviet propaganda--in the domestic service on 20 December by a commentators' roundtable panelist, who recalled as one of several examples of U.S. cold-warmongering the "rumpus" raised about a Soviet threat to the United States when "Soviet ships called at one of the Cuban ports." The situation, the commentator said, "was so presented as to make it appear that the Soviet Union was intending to build its base* for missile-carrying submarines in this port at which Soviet ships had called." He added: "As you know, the Soviet Government issued a statement denying this slander, but nevertheless this campaign is continuing."

In reporting and discussing President Nixon's 4 January televised conversation with newsmen, Moscow ignored his remark that he would regard the servicing of Soviet nuclear submarines "either in Cuba or from Cuba" as a violation of an understanding reached with the USSR in October.

* Moscow's carefully phrased denial in October stipulated that the USSR was not building its military base in Cuba, and authoritative Soviet press comment was explicit in denying construction of "a Soviet military base." See the TRENDS of 14 October 1970, page 33, for an examination of the TASS statement and Soviet central press comment. Followup articles appear in the TRENDS of 21 October and 18 November.

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Havana has never commented on the submarine base issue at an authoritative level. The only comment in monitored Havana media has come from the freewheeling commentator Guido Garcia Inclan in broadcasts over Radio Havana in October and November 1970. On 14 November Garcia Inclan claimed that the United States, "appalled" lest "Russia establish submarine bases on our island's southern coast," has been compelled to "disclose the Kennedy-Khrushchev agreement in the light of which they have to be very careful with Cuba, making certain that nobody lays a hand on her."

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GERMANY AND BERLIN

GDR PROTESTS CDU MEETING IN BERLIN, CRITICIZES SPD MEETING

The GDR reacted with a foreign ministry protest to the 6 February meeting of CDU land and parliamentary group leaders in West Berlin, while criticizing a meeting there of the SPD Executive's communal affairs committee on the 5th only in routine propaganda items.

In taking note on the 5th of the projected meeting of the SPD group, ADN simply recalled briefly that a GDR Foreign Ministry spokesman had "recently condemned similar activities by the FRG in West Berlin" and had said that such actions, which contravened official assurances of an FRG desire to contribute to a West Berlin settlement, could only add fuel to the tense situation in central Europe. NEUES DEUTSCHLAND published a similar report the next day. But on the 6th ADN reported that a foreign ministry spokesman that day had issued a "firm protest" against the CDU meeting, denouncing it in standard terms as a new attempt to demonstrate FRG claims on West Berlin in "gross violation" of West Berlin's status as "an independent political entity." The holding of the meeting, the spokesman said, was still another move calculated to hinder efforts at detente in Europe and obstruct the four-power talks on Berlin.

The CDU had not announced the meeting until the day before it took place--out of "consideration for the truck drivers," DPA explained, in light of the autobahn traffic slowdowns staged by the GDR in retaliation against prior meetings of this kind in West Berlin. An indirect allusion to this strategy appears in NEUES DEUTSCHLAND on the 7th, in a passage added to a report of the GDR Foreign Ministry protest that is otherwise substantially the same as the one transmitted the preceding day by ADN: "No one," NEUES DEUTSCHLAND said, "should assume that such provocative actions are considered any less serious if, as in this case, they are carried out without prior announcement."

NEUES DEUTSCHLAND
EDITORIAL ARTICLE

A NEUES DEUTSCHLAND editorial article on 3 February, carried in full by ADN on the same day, had presented what amounted to an authoritative apologia for the recent autobahn traffic slowdowns--referred to, as usual, euphemistically as the GDR's "completely legal countermeasures" against the FRG's "illegal" activities in

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West Berlin. The article was notable for a repeated effort to associate the Soviet Union with the GDR's actions. It stated, for example, that the organizers of the FRG meetings in West Berlin had met with "a decisive snub on the part of the GDR and the Soviet Union"; that "neither the GDR nor the Soviet Union is making any claims on West Berlin" as the FRG is doing; and that Bonn's activities in West Berlin are continuing "despite all the warnings from the GDR and the Soviet Union."

Further in the same vein, charging that Western propaganda distorts the West Berlin question and the proposal "by the GDR and the Soviet Union" concerning it, the article said "the GDR and the Soviet Union" have repeatedly stated that it is possible to reach "an agreement that would correspond to the interests of detente in the center of Europe and to the needs of all the West Berlin population, as well as to the lawful interests and sovereign rights of the GDR." This is in essence the formulation introduced by Brezhnev in his 29 November Yerevan speech, since echoed by Kosygin in his year-end ASAHI interview and recalled in other Soviet and GDR propaganda. The article charged the West German regime with actions contravening precisely the conditions under which, according to this formula, a settlement would be attainable.

In a veiled suggestion that the four-power talks may be placed in jeopardy by the West German activities in West Berlin, the editorial article accused Bonn of staging provocations "with the sole aim of worsening the situation and creating unnecessary difficulties for the continuation" of the talks. It warned more explicitly of retaliatory responses if the alleged provocations continued: Bonn's "misuse of West Berlin has met with resistance in the past and will continue to do so in the future."

East Berlin broadcasts have carried numerous followup commentaries echoing and endorsing the NEUES DEUTSCHLAND article. One of these on the evening of the 3d--against the background of Western news reports that Bonn and the Big Three were discussing possible reprisals against the GDR for the autobahn traffic slowdowns--denounced the Western powers for considering "reprisals" if the socialist states do not "accept the bending of the law by Bonn regarding West Berlin." The "dangers of a strategy of reprisals," the radio said, will not be for the socialist states but will be "by no means small for their initiators--and it is time Bonn realizes this."

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SOVIET COMMENT IGNORES SPD MEETING, DENOUNCES CDU GATHERING

A Khodakovsky dispatch in PRAVDA on 8 February, entitled "A New Provocation," assailed the CDU local and parliamentary group meeting in West Berlin on the 6th as a "new illegal action" while ignoring entirely the previous day's West Berlin meeting of the SPD communal affairs committee. Noting that the CDU meeting was not announced in advance in order "not to cause indignation" among West Berliners, who are 'fed up with such provocative actions,' the dispatch went on to summarize the GDR Foreign Ministry spokesman's 6 February protest.

On the 7th, Radio Moscow's Vasiliyev had strongly criticized the "illegal actions in West Berlin in the past two weeks" without identifying them. Citing unspecified reports in the U.S. and British press, Vasiliyev charged that "some Western powers, participants in the four-power contacts on West Berlin, are banking on a protraction of these contacts." Citing DPA on a "rumor from Washington" to the effect that "a temporary discontinuation of the ambassadorial talks on West Berlin is even being contemplated," Vasiliyev said "this blackmail cannot be interpreted in any way other than as an attempt to exert pressure on the Soviet Union and the GDR." He added that, "of course, such an attempt is doomed to failure."

TASS and ADN on the 8th both issued their customary terse summaries, without comment, of the official communique on the 14th meeting of the ambassadorial talks that day.

SOVIET REPORT ON GDR
EDITORIAL ARTICLE

A 4 February account of the preceding day's NEUES DEUTSCHLAND editorial article decrying the West Berlin "provocations" was broadcast repeatedly by Radio Moscow in German but to no other audience. The account, by PRAVDA's GDR correspondent Podklyuchnikov, reflected the basic thrust of the editorial article but softened its language somewhat and left out all the passages about reprisals--the East German paper's statement that the GDR and USSR had met the FRG's actions with a "decisive snub" as well as the reference to past and future Soviet-GDR "resistance" to FRG "misuse" of West Berlin.

Where NEUES DEUTSCHLAND charged Bonn with raising "difficulties for the continuation" of the four-power talks, the Soviet summary said the article charged Bonn with trying to exacerbate the situation and create "obstacles along the road of further exchange of opinion among the four powers." The summary included NEUES DEUTSCHLAND's

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unattributed recapitulation of the Brezhnev formula on a Berlin settlement and the GDR paper's reminder that GDR and Soviet proposals are "lying on the table and awaiting a reply"--a point Moscow has made repeatedly in its own recent comment.

EARLIER COMMENT IN
PRAVDA, IZVESTIYA

While the PRAVDA correspondent's summary of the NEUES DEUTSCHLAND editorial article excluded its references to joint Soviet-GDR reprisals against FRG activities in West Berlin, a lengthy IZVESTIYA article on 31 January by P. Verin referred in broader terms--characteristic of Soviet comment--to the "consequences" of such FRG activities. The USSR and GDR, Verin said, "cannot remain indifferent to what is going on," and "it is time for the organizers of these provocative excesses in West Berlin and those who are backing them to clearly realize that they are assuming the entire responsibility for the possible consequences."

The Verin article identified the "organizers" as the CDU/CSU, picturing the SPD-FDP government coalition as equally guilty but as acting out of concern lest the government be "outdone" by its domestic political opponents. Verin directed his remarks chiefly at the Western powers "who are backing them." He recalled that "on more than one occasion the governments of the Soviet Union and the GDR have drawn the West Berlin occupation authorities' attention to the inadmissibility of utilizing the city for purposes which can in no way be made to fit the inter-allied decisions."* The Western powers "have not heeded the notice" of the Soviet and East German governments, Verin said, and have "embarked upon the road of accomplices of the organizers of irresponsible actions in West Berlin whose sole purpose is to show disrespect for the status" of West Berlin and for "the current four-power talks."

A briefer Khodakovskiy article in PRAVDA on the same day directed its fire only at Bonn, listing the alleged provocations in West Berlin including the meeting of FDP parliamentary leaders and the appearance of Brandt and Heinemann in West Berlin at the end of January. Charging routinely that the aim of these activities is to again demonstrate Bonn's "absurd pretensions to West Berlin,

* Soviet media still have not acknowledged the 27 January oral protest by the Soviet embassy to the three Western embassies in West Berlin on the FDP parliamentary leaders' meeting there. Moscow did report the Soviet protests at the time of the CDU/CSU and SPD meetings in West Berlin in November and December, respectively.

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which never belonged and will never belong" to the FRG, Khodakovskiy concluded that these attempts to "interfere" in West Berlin are in "obvious contradiction to the official assurances of the FRG Government that it will further the settlement of the West Berlin problem."

STOPH OFFERS PROPOSALS TO WEST BERLIN ON RELATIONS WITH GDR

At a 4 February meeting with the chairman of the Socialist Unity Party of West Berlin (SEW), Danelius, East German Premier Stoph spelled out a proposal for direct agreements between the GDR and the West Berlin Senat that in effect would set aside Big Four responsibility for the city. ADN's report of the Stoph-Danelius meeting, published the following day in NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, was also carried virtually verbatim by TASS.

Paying lip-service to the four-power talks and noting that "objective conditions exist" to remove West Berlin as a center of tension, Stoph and Danelius both "stressed the great importance" of the ambassadorial talks, according to the ADN report, and called for a solution corresponding to the needs of the West Berliners and the "lawful interests and sovereign rights of the GDR"--the basic conditions of a Berlin settlement contained in the Brezhnev formulation of 29 November. They also stressed, the report says, that an improvement in the West Berlin situation depends on the "termination of the political presence of the FRG and the cessation of all revanchist, militarist, and antipeace activities in West Berlin."

The report says Stoph explained that if there is "strict respect for the status of West Berlin as a separate political entity," there could be "mutually advantageous and useful agreements and settlements" between West Berlin and the GDR. The GDR would then be "ready under the appropriate conditions," Stoph continued, to reach agreements with the West Berlin Senat which would "give West Berlin economic, scientific-technical, and cultural relations with all states, including the FRG"--a move which would in effect usurp Big Four responsibility for Berlin.

The report says Stoph proposed a three-point agreement between the GDR and the West Berlin Senat

- 1) to safeguard the transit traffic of West Berlin citizens and goods to and from all states; 2) to make transit traffic as simple and expedient as possible; and 3) to seal transit

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goods transported by rail, road, or river after inspection at the point of entry and to limit procedures at the point of exit to the removal of the seal.

He also proposed a GDR agreement with West Berlin on border adjustments regarding the Steinstuecken enclave, according to the report.

ADN and TASS noted, in brief accounts of a press conference held by Danelius on the 8th, that the SEW leader said his party--which is campaigning for votes in the 14 March West Berlin elections--was "willing to inform" the Senat of the GDR proposals.

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POLAND-USSR

MOSCOW GIVES POLISH PARTY PLENUM EXTENSIVE PUBLICITY

Registering an apparently more sanguine view of Gierek's control over the Polish developments than it held in the early days of the new regime, Moscow has given notably detailed publicity to the 6-7 February eighth plenum of the Polish United Workers Party (PZPR). Soviet media had given the 20 December PZPR plenum correct coverage: TASS and PRAVDA carried a brief report of Gierek's takeover from Gomulka and the other personnel changes, a biography of Gierek, and the text of the new First Secretary's generally mild speech. There was only a terse report, obscuring the details, of the tension-filled visit of Gierek and Premier Jaroszewicz to the coastal cities of Szczecin and Gdansk on 24-25 January.

Now TASS reports recount in detail the opening of the plenum on 6 February, the unusual television report to the nation that evening by Politburo member Olszowski on the first day's proceedings, the plenum's final resolution, and the main points of Gierek's two-hour plenum report. All of these reports except the one on Gierek's speech have already appeared in PRAVDA. TASS gives a full account of the resolution's announcement of the "suspension" of Gomulka from the Central Committee and the "removal" of Kliszko and Jaszczuk from that body; the "resignation" of former Szczecin party chief Walaszek from the Central Committee; and the "resignation" of former trade union head Loga-Sowinski and former Gdansk party chief Kociolek from the Politburo.

The accounts include the resolution's explanation of the milder action on Gomulka--to the effect that the former First Secretary's "further participation" in the work of the Central Committee was "impossible" but that "having in view Wladyslaw Gomulka's absence, because of ill health, from the seventh plenum of the Central Committee as well as from the present plenum, the Central Committee resolves to suspend" him as a Central Committee member.

While carrying extensive reportage on Gierek's indirect criticism of Gomulka, TASS softens somewhat the one passage in which he mentioned the former First Secretary by name: TASS says that "speaking about the evaluation of the role of Wladyslaw Gomulka, the speaker said that such an evaluation required a longer period

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of time and that it should be just and should not diminish his personal merits and services to the party and state." In the recorded apparent text carried by the Warsaw domestic service on the 7th, Gierek said an appraisal of "the previous leadership's" policy "calls for a longer passage of time" and that

this applies particularly to the appraisal of the role of Comrade Wladyslaw Gomulka. This must be a just appraisal, and this is very difficult to obtain under the pressure of recent events, bitterness, and current difficulties. Without in any way minimizing his personal achievements and work given to the party and state, we must state that unfortunately somewhere in the mid-sixties, after the fourth congress, the crisis in the leadership of the party and state became more and more apparent.

Nevertheless, in reporting Gierek's recitation of the causes of the December disturbances, TASS carries the most explicit acknowledgment of serious disorders and the strongest indictment of the former party leadership's role to appear in Soviet media to date in connection with the Polish events. Duly included is Gierek's report of a death toll of 45 in the coastal riots and of 1,165 injured, including 654 civilians, 531 militiamen, and 70 soldiers. TASS notes that Gierek "described the destructive manifestations during the December events as a side effect of developments whose roots should be sought in a conflict of a social character"; that he condemned the "use of force in response to the workers' demonstration" as an ill-conceived move which "led to its aggravation and threatened an outright catastrophe"; and that he said the "then leadership's" decision to use force was taken "contrary to the better judgment of the majority of party activists, without consultations with the Politburo of the PZPR Central Committee, and even without informing the Central Committee which debated the situation on the coast on 14 December."

TASS includes Gierek's further indictment of the party's conduct in the crisis: "The workers' demonstrations were orderly at the beginning, but there was no frank talk with the workers and the tension was not eased," and, "as a result, the events spilled into the streets and got out of hand." In the background was "a crisis of confidence in the party and government leadership" due to a longstanding "weakening and grave infringement of the links between the party leadership and the working class."

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TASS gives predictably heavy emphasis to Gierek's call for stepped-up labor productivity as the main solution to the country's economic woes and for continuation of Poland's present foreign policy--solidarity with the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact--"which is correct in all basic issues."

WARSAW REPORTS CONTINUED TOUGH STANCE BY COASTAL WORKERS

PAP on 9 February carried an extensive report of an article in that day's Polish Government newspaper ZYCIE WARSZAWY which portrays the coastal shipyard workers as accepting the 6-7 February plenum's interpretation of the December events but as waiting to be shown whether the regime's actions will measure up to its stated intentions.

Recounting interviews with allegedly representative workers in Gdansk and Gdynia, "not casual people" but those "who were at the head of the protest," the paper quotes them as remarking that the plenum's explanation of the December events was "maybe not the way we saw them at that time of indignation, but as we see and evaluate them today after sober rethinking." The workers reportedly noted that the plenum "properly understood" their intentions--"we did not want to overthrow the system; we demanded indispensable changes, renovation."

But the paper imputes to the workers only a qualified endorsement of Gierek's economic program: It "comes a long way" toward incorporating "many postulates of ours." They are quoted as saying they "understand" it will "take a lot of time" to implement the program, but as adding: "We want these results to be conspicuous quickly," and "we want to be informed on all current steps being taken to implement these intentions." The workers, ZYCIE WARSZAWY says, are asking that information of the type given by Gierek on his visit to the coast be "always available and sincere," so that "the pre-December situation shall never recur."

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ALBANIA-YUGOSLAVIA

TIRANA, BELGRADE ANNOUNCE DECISION TO EXCHANGE AMBASSADORS

Albanian and Yugoslav media on 5 February announced the two countries' decision to raise their respective diplomatic missions to embassy status and exchange ambassadors, thereby normalizing state relations which have been handled since 1958 through legations headed by chargés d'affaires.

While Tirana announced the decision without comment, TANJUG, releasing its announcement on 3 February in a news item embargoed until the 5th, noted that the move was in accord with the Yugoslav Federal Executive Council's decision "to raise the rank of all Yugoslav diplomatic representations abroad to embassy level" as well as with "the gradual promotion of cooperation" between Yugoslavia and Albania.

Subsequent Yugoslav comment has underscored the fact that the normalization of relations is limited to the state sphere and has sought to justify it as based on common interests and shared "dangers" which override continuing differences. Thus an article in BORBA on the 6th observed that Tirana, while ready to develop good relations at the state level, will continue to "make ideological and political criticism of Yugoslavia's internal development." It added that despite Yugoslavia's "reservations" about this double-edge approach, "there are no reasons not to develop good relations with Albania on this basis." The two states have "common interests," BORBA said, and both exist "in a world full of dangers, especially when it comes to the security and independence of all states."

Radio Zagreb's political commentator Sundic on the 5th elaborated essentially the same rationale for the move. Cautioning against any attempts to "read into" the decision to exchange ambassadors "things which do not and cannot exist," Sundic commented that good relations between Albania and Yugoslavia are "a prerequisite for our independence and represent the surest obstacle to foreign interference in our internal affairs." Noting that both countries "are vitally interested in seeing the Balkans and the Mediterranean become a zone of peace, not a zone of contest between the two big powers," the commentator concluded that "our relations are not and cannot be aimed against anyone else."

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BACKGROUND The move had been foreshadowed last year by avowals on both sides of a desire for improved relations based on mutual interests. Notably, Tirana's ATA quoted Albanian leader Hoxha on 30 May as urging closer relations, promising not to interfere in Yugoslavia's affairs, and pointing to a common Yugoslav-Albanian bond deriving from shared subjection to a Soviet "threat"--a line that had been appearing sporadically in Tirana propaganda since the invasion of Czechoslovakia. Tito on 7 August, in a speech broadcast over Radio Zagreb, reciprocated Hoxha's call for improved relations and pledge of noninterference, pointed to possibilities for expanding economic cooperation, and saw prospects for good state relations despite ideological differences. Though in more cautious terms than Hoxha, Tito also raised the notion of a common bond by recalling that Albanians and Yugoslavs had fought together during World War II and adding that "today the situation is such that we have much in common."*

The regularization of Yugoslav-PRC state relations last year may have helped clear the way for Tirana to go ahead with the normalization of its ties with Belgrade. NCNA reported the new Yugoslav ambassador's presentation of credentials in Peking in late May, and Belgrade reported the new Chinese ambassador's arrival in Belgrade in mid-August. Tirana's report of the decision to exchange ambassadors with Belgrade was picked up promptly by NCNA on 6 February. Soviet media ignored it.

* See the TRENDS of 12 August 1970, pages 34-35.

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USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS

VORONOV'S TOP DEPUTY IN RSFSR LEADERSHIP IS REMOVED

K.G. Pysin, first deputy premier of the RSFSR and Voronov's chief deputy in the RSFSR leadership for the past 6 years, has retired following indications that he has been in disfavor. His retirement on pension was reported by PRAVDA on 2 February, just a little over a month after his 60th birthday, and no successor has yet been announced. His removal could signify another blow at the already shaky position of RSFSR Premier Voronov, 2 months prior to the scheduled convening of the 24th CPSU Congress.

The first sign of Pysin's disfavor appeared in mid-1970 when he was not reelected to the USSR Supreme Soviet. Since then, he has appeared infrequently, indicating the possibility of illness. His most recent activities included a visit to a cattle exhibit with Voronov (KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, 2 October) and heading up the agriculture and land use section at the November RSFSR conference of heads of local soviets (SOVIET RUSSIA, 26 November).

Voronov has also been out of sight much of the time since August 1970. He was awarded an Order of Lenin at the end of August, but it was not presented to him until 5 months later (PRAVDA, 30 January 1971). The awarding of the Order of Lenin, and nothing more, was in itself something of a slight; other Politburo members had been granted higher honors on their decennial birthdays (see FBIS TRENDS, 2 December 1970, page 33).

Even though failing health may be the main reason for Pysin's retirement, a deliberate effort was made to discredit him last year. On his 60th birthday in December he was awarded an Order of the Red Banner instead of the more prestigious Order of Lenin (PRAVDA, 24 December 1970). As a provincial first secretary in December 1960, he had received an Order of Lenin on his 50th birthday (PRAVDA, 25 December 1960). The receipt of the lesser award was particularly demeaning since Pysin, as RSFSR agricultural supervisor, could boast of a very successful RSFSR harvest in 1970.

Pysin's treatment contrasts with that of Sverdlovsk First Secretary K.K. Nikolayev, who also appears to have been out of favor and who was retired at age 60 on 6 January this year.

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Nikolayev received an Order of Lenin on his 60th birthday on 29 May 1970, and he was reelected to the USSR Supreme Soviet.

Collaboration between Pysin and Voronov on agricultural policies began in 1960 when Pysin was Altay first secretary and Voronov was Orenburg first secretary, and continued when Pysin became USSR agriculture minister and Voronov became RSFSR Bureau deputy chairman. After Khrushchev's fall, RSFSR Premier Voronov chose Pysin as his top deputy for agriculture, and Pysin has championed Voronov's policies. Pysin has been especially vigorous in promoting mechanized links, arguing at length for them as far back as the January 1961 CPSU Central Committee plenum.

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PRC INTERNAL AFFAIRS

PROBLEMS OF "7 MAY SCHOOLS" DISCUSSED IN THE PROPAGANDA

During the past few months, PRC media have made it increasingly clear that a truly good cadre must also be an educated cadre. He must first be willing to follow orders blindly, but he must also have sufficient understanding of Maoist doctrine to act correctly in those areas where leeway is allowed.

Because of this requirement, the 7 May schools, which were set up during the cultural revolution mainly for the reeducation of erring cadres, have recently received new propaganda attention as academies for Mao's Thought. Cadres are being told that all must attend these schools in order to be qualified for their jobs; the more senior the cadre, the longer he should attend. While the regime has always insisted that 7 May schools were not punishment camps, the preponderance of erring cadres in attendance has made it more difficult to portray them as training schools for the elite.

On 3 February NCNA reported on a "recent" conference of 7 May schools, supervised by departments under the Central Committee and State Council, which pointed up some of the problems now being confronted. According to NCNA, these departments are now responsible for more than 90,000 cadre students in more than 100 schools, operated on the model of the Yenan Anti-Japanese College. This college, headed by Mao and Lin, conducted both farming and educational activities during the first great rectification campaign, the cheng feng movement, in the early 1940's. Then as now, Mao was struggling against opposition in the party and at the same time was faced with the need to educate many new cadres (the cadres of that earlier era had rallied to the CCP during the war, more for reasons of nationalism than communism).

The conference report makes it clear that the 7 May schools themselves must still undergo rectification before they can graduate good Maoists. Some of the blame for the difficulties is laid at the door of "a handful of class enemies" allegedly guilty of "sabotage to this way of training cadres." Such a problem was eased in the former Ministry for Allocation of Materials, the report states, when it used mass criticism to "discredit bad elements."

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EDUCATION
VS. LABOR

Most problems, however, appear to be caused by something more tangible, and perhaps more difficult to overcome, than unnamed "class enemies."

This is the difficulty of maintaining the correct ratio of education to physical labor--preventing the schools from degenerating into either ivory towers or camps for hard labor.

This issue--whether labor or education should be emphasized--has been prominent from the inauguration of the 7 May schools. Although during the early stages of the schools' development in 1968 there were warnings matching that of the conference report to the effect that "physical labor in itself does not give rise to an awareness of continuing the revolution," labor reform was the chief method propagandized. The fact that many schools were set up in rather desolate areas, with few amenities, meant that most of the students' energies had to be given over to construction.

Now the leadership is faced with the problem of requiring students to continue their physical exertions in improvement projects and raising crops while devoting new attention to ideology. There are no indications that work loads are to be significantly eased, and in fact several recent media items praised 7 May schools for their productivity. An NCNA report on 24 January claimed that the "race against time for agricultural production" has been instrumental in making cadres more alert when they are back in their offices. The successes in production have created their own problems, however. The conference report notes that some leading cadres have become so engrossed with the physical achievements of the school that they forget their ideological purpose. Some cadres in the Materials Allocation Ministry are criticized for thinking that after one or two years of tempering in the schools their transformation is "almost perfect," for regarding time spent at labor as the main point instead of the ideological strengthening they require.

A more traditional problem, "regarding labor as punishment," also persists, according to a joint PEOPLE'S DAILY-NCNA article released on 28 January. The article reported such wrong ideas were prevalent at the school run by the General Office of the CCP Central Committee. Another difficulty noted in the article, not usually hinted at in the media, is that of morale problems among cadres teaching at the schools. Fearful for their jobs after some were transferred to other posts, leadership cadres are said to have expressed "doubt that the school would continue to operate for a

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long time." While reassuring them as to the permanence of the school, the article specifies that cadres should not expect to remain at the schools permanently. In this system there is obviously some concern about creating an ivory-tower teaching cadre, freed of major responsibilities.

PROVINCIAL MODEL The original "model" 7 May school, popularized in 1968, was that at Liuho, Heilungkiang, operated for the benefit of provincial cadres. More specific details regarding work and organization are available for the school at Liuho and for other provincial schools than for the central schools.

On 3 January, a revealing directive from the Heilungkiang provincial authorities, broadcast by Radio Peking, warned of the need "to schedule time for study and time for labor in a scientific manner, and to guard against the tendency to have the cadres merely engage in labor." The article reiterated that "participation in productive labor is for the purpose of receiving training," and that student cadres must also make "social investigations" outside the schools and study works by Mao, Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin.

The importance of the 7 May schools was emphasized by the injunctions on leadership issued by the Heilungkiang authorities. Top leaders of cadre schools are to be the "key members of party organizations" at the same level, and "outstanding cadres" are to be selected to join the leading groups at the schools. The new and higher status being accorded the schools was also indicated by a Kiangsi broadcast of 12 January which stated that higher-ranking cadres will spend longer terms in the schools. Cadres at the county or regimental levels, "whose rotational training program is under the charge of the province," are to spend 2 months in training each time; commune-level cadres fall under the control of the special district school and serve a month at a time, and party branch and brigade cadres under county control spend 2 weeks on each course.

MILITARY SCHOOLS There are fewer details on military cadre schools, but a Hopeh Military District article printed in *PEOPLE'S DAILY* on 4 January indicated that there is little difference in the operations. As in the provincial schools, a "growing number of the cadres assigned to the school are new." The Hopeh Military District 7 May school is said to be in its third year, with 80 percent of those trained this year having been leading cadres who received their appointments "only in the past one or two years," although presumably they had been lower-grade officers for some years previously. And in the war college tradition, cadres

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"selected for future promotion" are increasingly being sent to the school.

The course of training advocated by Hopec places considerable importance on the "particular characteristics" of the individual students. Some units are said to have sent to the schools, along with the new students, personnel who could brief the school on the students' ideological level. The necessity for training the new cadres is best indicated by the article's admission that students "knew very little about the history of the struggle in the party and the PLA" and were not good at distinguishing between the correct and the incorrect line. That this should be the case among military officers, most "above battalion level," who have been presumably receiving some training in Mao's Thought for over 10 years, indicates that the situation among civilians may be far worse.

HAINAN ISLAND ESTABLISHES ITS NEW PARTY COMMITTEE

Although no new provincial party committees were announced during the past week, party rebuilding continues to make progress at the lower levels. The Kwangtung provincial radio on 5 February announced the formation of new committees for the Huiyang special district (which borders on Hong Kong) and Hainan Island, or "Hainan administrative district." While Kwangtung also has a new provincial party committee and claimed on 20 December that the majority of municipalities had set up new committees, none has yet been formed for the city of Canton.

The brief Canton report on the Hainan committee stressed the fact that Hainan, "situated in the frontline of coastal defense," must be built into a "sea battle fortress" in the "shortest possible time." A 7 February Haikow radio report, welcoming the Hainan committee, linked the need for rapid fulfillment of various local economic tasks to meeting war preparation needs. The broadcast declared that everything must be done "in the light of preparedness against war," and "if the enemy dares to invade, we will wipe him out completely."

Elsewhere, county party committees continue to be mentioned for the first time in numerous radio broadcasts from several provinces. A 3 February Changsha radio broadcast announced the formation of a new party committee in Changsha, capital of Hunan, Mao's native province.

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SUPPLEMENTARY ARTICLE

PRC DISCUSSES POSSIBLE U.S. USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Peking's discussion of military developments in Indochina has been accompanied by a flurry of references to possible U.S. use of tactical nuclear weapons, with nine items mentioning this subject since it was first broached in an NCNA dispatch datelined Stockholm, 29 January.* The most authoritative comment on the subject appeared in a paragraph that was inserted into a 4 February PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article some six hours after the original transmission of the article. The 4 February and 8 February PRC Foreign Ministry statements do not mention nuclear weapons.

Apart from a statement by Sihanouk's government transmitted by NCNA on 6 February, there has been no echo from Indochinese communist sources of Peking's expression of concern over the possible use of nuclear weapons in Indochina. Though Peking may have simply seized on recent foreign press material to exploit a new anti-U.S. propaganda theme, its recent surge of attention devoted to the subject and its unusual treatment of the PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article may reflect genuine concern over possible future U.S. actions during a period of troop withdrawal.

Peking's discussion has been based on Swedish and Japanese press material citing evidence that the United States is "contemplating" the use of nuclear weapons in Indochina and is sounding out public opinion in this regard. But while Peking's discussion is focused on a possible U.S. use of tactical nuclear arms in the Indochina theater--an eventuality which Peking warns would provoke worldwide indignation and a "revolutionary storm" of protest in the United States--some of its comment suggests a broader context involving questions of the future role of nuclear weapons in Washington's Asian strategy. Thus, a commentary carried in NCNA's domestic service on 6 February and its international service in English on the 8th discusses an article in the January issue of FOREIGN AFFAIRS analyzing the implications of the Nixon Doctrine. The article's author, Earl Ravenal, a former Defense Department official, is quoted as saying that the Nixon Doctrine could lead "in certain extremities" to a choice among

* Discussed in the TRENDS of 3 February 1971, page 13.

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"unlimited conventional escalation, defeat of our forces, or use of nuclear weapons." Ravenal's article is also mentioned in a 4 February NCNA account of Japanese press comment on a possible U.S. use of nuclear weapons in the "extremely dangerous" situation developing in Indochina. Ravenal is identified in the account as having been "personally engaged in policymaking" at the Pentagon concerning U.S. policy on Asia, "including China and Indochina." The discussions of the Ravenal article in Peking's accounts do not note that it analyzes the Nixon Doctrine in the context of a critical examination of the policy of containment of China. While Peking frequently attacks the Nixon Doctrine in such contexts as Indochina and Japan's role as a U.S. ally, it has avoided addressing the subject within a Sino-U.S. context.

Another commentary, attributed to a member of a PLA air force unit and transmitted by NCNA on the 8th to domestic and international consumers, applies the Maoist line that "the atom bomb is a paper tiger" in discussing the Swedish and Japanese reports. The commentary reviews the period since the United States had a monopoly on atomic bombs to claim that possession of nuclear weapons has not changed the course of developments. In this connection it mentions that the then Vice President Nixon had advocated the use of nuclear weapons at the time of the 1954 Dien Bien Phu battle.

BACKGROUND OF PEKING'S INSERTION OF PASSAGE ON NUCLEAR ARMS

The original version of the 4 February PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article was carried by the Peking domestic radio at 2233 GMT 3 February and by the NCNA domestic service at 2307 GMT 3 February. At 0037 GMT 4 February the NCNA international service in English began transmitting the article but discontinued after about three paragraphs; for the next five hours this service carried only repeat traffic. At 0145 GMT the NCNA domestic service carried a service message instructing provincial and local papers (which receive central press material via this service) "to suspend printing temporarily." The NCNA domestic service proceeded with normal traffic after this service message. (Earlier, at 2135 GMT 3 February, the NCNA domestic service had carried a service message holding publication until further notice of a RED FLAG article on cadre rectification which had been transmitted three hours earlier. A service message at 1730 GMT 5 February instructed papers to publish the article on

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6 February. There is no sign that the delay of this article was connected with the suspension of printing.)

At 0430 GMT 4 February, some six hours after the original version had been broadcast, both the NCNA domestic service and the Peking domestic radio retransmitted the PEOPLE'S DAILY article; but the text as now carried contained a paragraph, not in the original version, which discusses a possible U.S. use of nuclear weapons in Indochina. At the conclusion of this transmission, the NCNA domestic service appended an instruction releasing the article to provincial and local papers. NCNA transmitted the enlarged version in English at 0536 GMT 4 February.

Judging from this sequence of events, from NCNA's unusual instruction to suspend printing of local papers, and from the content of the inserted passage, it appears that a decision was made in Peking to include in this authoritative commentary a passage on a sensitive subject which Peking in recent years had mentioned only in noting that the United States had used a wide range of tactics and weapons short of nuclear arms. The passage cites the Swedish and Japanese press as having "exposed recently" that the Nixon Administration is contemplating the use of nuclear weapons in Indochina and is sounding out public opinion for this. "If the Nixon Administration dares to use nuclear weapons," the article declares, it will become "a most vicious and implacable criminal," will incur worldwide indignation, and will "stir up an ever more powerful revolutionary storm in the United States." The earlier NCNA dispatch from Stockholm had also referred to public opinion, observing that "many well-informed U.S. scientists and politicians feel quite uneasy about the matter" and have made contacts with Western political figures outside the United States "so as to arouse international public opinion to stop this crazy act."

The PEOPLE'S DAILY article's citation of the Japanese press was documented later on the 4th in an NCNA account of articles in Japanese papers rounding up evidence that Washington might decide to use nuclear weapons in Indochina. The account recalled that the then Vice President Nixon advocated the use of tactical nuclear weapons at the time of Dien Bien Phu, and it cited a book by Henry Kissinger as containing the idea of using such weapons. Like the 29 January NCNA dispatch from Stockholm, the account referred to a forcible removal of peasants from the northern part of South Vietnam as preparation for using nuclear weapons there.

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NCNA's account of the Japanese articles cited as its source a report by the TOHO news agency* on 2 February. The insertion of the passage in the PEOPLE'S DAILY article citing the Japanese as well as the Swedish press, followed by NCNA's account of the Japanese comment, suggests that it may have been the availability of the latter material which prompted a last-minute decision by Peking to enlarge the Commentator article to include the passage on nuclear weapons. Another factor may have been an article from Paris on 3 February by the New York TIMES' C.L. Sulzberger reporting that the North Vietnamese and Chinese have recently hinted "some nervousness about the chances that the United States might introduce tactical nuclear weapons in Indochina." A Sulzberger article on this subject in the New York TIMES last November was mentioned in the 29 January NCNA Stockholm dispatch. Peking may have shied away from citing the 3 February Sulzberger article out of sensitivity to a scenario outlined in the article envisaging a U.S. use of nuclear bombs against the PRC following Chinese intervention into Indochina.

Subsequent references in PRC media to nuclear weapons in Indochina are contained in the two commentaries carried by NCNA, discussed above; a Cambodian Royal Government of National Union statement transmitted by NCNA on the 6th; and statements by an Afro-Asian journalists' organ based in Peking, a group in Sweden, and a Tokyo rally, transmitted by NCNA on the 7th, 8th, and 9th respectively.

* TOHO has a Tokyo-Peking circuit.

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